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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
In light of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (hereinafter, “BEPS”) 
delivered by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereinafter, “OECD1”), it is worth revising the existing allocation rules for 
business income derived from some of the most followed Model 
Conventions. Some of the proposed changes to the OECD Model Convention 
(hereinafter, “OECD MC”) suggested by the BEPS project have already been 
implemented by the United Nations Model of Double Taxation Convention 
between Developed and Developing Countries2 (hereinafter, “UN MC”). 
In the OECD Report on BEPS it is stated that in its origins, Model 
Conventions were drafted with the aim of preventing double taxation in order 
to promote international trade. From the early 1920s, countries have worked 
together to eliminate double taxation in order to remove the obstacles for trade 
and economic growth3. The OECD Report on BEPS states that the 
cooperation developed by the States in order to prevent double taxation has 
reached its objective but at the same time it has proved to have some 
weaknesses which create opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting4.  
In this context, even though the OECD Report on BEPS states that no or low 
taxation are not a problem in themselves as long as they are not achieved by 
way of artificially segregating the taxable income from the activities that 
produce such income5, it could be argued that they are indeed considered to 
be a problem for States. For instance, Action Plan 7 from the BEPS project 
aims to tackle the artificial avoidance of the PE status as it is defined by the 
OECD MC. However, it could be argued that the PE status can also be easily 
avoided without the need of any sort of artificiality. For example, the current 
PE threshold from the OECD MC requires either a physical presence in the 
source State or an indirect presence through the use of a dependent agent. 
Nevertheless, there are some business models that do not even need to have 
any sort of physical presence in the country of source, consequently, they do 
not even need to require to sophisticated aggressive tax planning structures. 
This is what happens for example with companies that simply rely on digital 
sources in order to sell goods in different countries without even having a PE 
in such countries, or on enterprises whose businesses consists only on the 
provision of services abroad. Thus, when looking in depth which might be the 
                                                 
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The MC used for this study is 
the last updated version (2014). 
2 The MC used for this study is the last updated version (2011). 
3 Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Report 2013, Chapter 2, Page 9.  
4 Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Report 2013, Chapter 2, Page 9. 
5 Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Report 2013, Chapter 2, Page 10. 
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actual aim of the BEPS project, no or low taxation are in fact a problem in 
themselves for States, even if they are not the result of an artificiality. 
In this context, some States are seeing that due to the current PE threshold 
provided by the OECD MC a portion of tax revenue is being lost since there 
are income generating activities which end up being untaxed. Due to the fact 
that some activities do not fall under the scope of the PE threshold as defined 
by the OECD MC, States are willing to revise such threshold in order to 
include into the PE concept activities that up to now have been left for those 
countries which follow the UN MC (which is only aimed for the protection 
of developing countries6).   
Nevertheless, the current PE threshold of the OECD MC was established in a 
way to be compatible with the objective of capital exporting countries whose 
desire was to give primacy to residence taxation over source taxation. 
According to Peggy Musgrave, capital export neutrality tends to be more 
desirable since it provides an efficient allocation of resources7. In addition to 
this, the best way to achieve capital export neutrality would be by choosing 
the “tax credit” as a mechanism for eliminating double taxation instead of 
“tax exemption”. In this sense, capital export neutrality favours residence-
based taxation8 and the OECD´s PE threshold was defined in a manner for 
residence taxation to prevail over source taxation. Since capital exporting 
countries needed to grant a tax credit to its residents for the taxes paid abroad 
as a consequence of their investments, in order to achieve such “neutrality”, 
they claimed for a narrower PE threshold. If a narrower PE threshold exists, 
then capital exporting countries are able to secure, to a certain extent, their 
revenue, since the cases in which they would have to grant a tax credit will 
be less abundant or will be limited only to specific situations.  
The narrower the PE threshold, the more difficult for a non-resident who 
invests abroad to be subject to taxation in the source jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the cases in which the residence country of the investor would have to grant 
a tax credit would be restricted only to the existence of a fixed place of 
business or a dependent agent.   
In this context, since the preferences when drafting the OECD´s PE threshold 
where put on a residence-based taxation system, a number of theories where 
elaborated in order to justify source taxation, being the benefits principle and 
the economic allegiance theory the strongest ones. Each of these theories 
                                                 
6 United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries 2011, Page VI, Paragraph 3. 
7 Klaus Vogel, “Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Harmonization and Tax Neutrality under 
European Community Law: An institutional approach” (1994), Page 21 cited by Dale Pinto, 
“E-commerce and Source-based Income Taxation”, Doctoral Series, Academic Council 6, 
IBFD, 2003, Page 24. 
8 Dale Pinto, “E-commerce and Source-based Income Taxation”, Doctoral Series, Academic 
Council 6, IBFD, 2003, Page 24. 
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require a substantial nexus between the non-resident and the source country. 
The current OECD´s PE threshold requires either a direct physical presence 
(fixed place of business) or an indirect presence through a legal representative 
(dependent agent).  
On the other hand, Model Conventions such as the UN MC, provide a wider 
PE threshold, including income generating activities which are not included 
under the OECD PE threshold. The first justification that has been established 
for widening the PE threshold in the UN MC is the aim of protecting the 
source base of developing countries9. Due to this protective policy, it is 
accepted to expand the PE threshold for shifting less tax revenue from source 
countries to residence countries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the UN 
MC still requires the existence of a PE in the source State in order to justify 
source taxation. However, another MC such as the Andean Community 
Income and Capital Tax Convention10 (hereinafter, “the Andean Pact MC” or 
the “Andean Pact Model”) achieves a full protection of the source jurisdiction 
by simply not including the concept of PE into the MC. In other words, source 
taxation, under the terms of the Andean Pact Model, does not need to be 
justified by the existence of a PE. The Andean Pact Model – whose Member 
States are categorized as developing countries11 – tries to secure source-based 
taxation by way of taxing any activity developed within its jurisdiction, even 
if the activity does not hold a deep substance.  
In this context, it can be appreciated that differences in PE thresholds – 
depending on the tax policy that is sought to be achieved – might cast doubt 
on whether residence-based taxation is preferable over source-based taxation, 
especially if taken into consideration the current trends on electronic 
commerce. While the protection of source taxation and the broadening of the 
taxing powers of the source country have been originally left for developing 
countries, such current trends on electronic commerce prove that the 
protection of source taxation does not necessary has to do with the level of 
industrialization of a country. An example of this statement, as it will be later 
explained, can be appreciated by the suggestions included in Action Plan 7 as 
regards the exclusion of the word “delivery” from the “preparatory or 
auxiliary activities”. In other words, if this exclusion ends up been 
implemented, the OECD MC would have broaden the PE threshold by way 
of including what is known as “delivery PE”. In this regard, Action Plan 712 
                                                 
9 United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries 2011, Page VI, Paragraph 3.  
10 The MC used for this study is the last updated version (2004). 
11 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela. The categorization as developing 
countries has been taken from: DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for reporting on 2014, 
2015 and 2016 flows, OECD Aid Statistics. Electronic information available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm  
12 Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of the PE 
Status”, 2014/2015, OECD, Page 16. 
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highlights the arguments provided by the UN Commentaries in relation to the 
“delivery PE”. Even though a large number of the developing countries do 
not have the so-called “delivery PE”, those countries that have introduced 
such concept into their tax treaties, have argued that the existence of a 
warehouse established for delivery of goods, eases the sale of those goods in 
the source country without the need of having the substantial “physical 
presence” required by the PE threshold. 
It should be noted that Action Plan 7 on its Introduction states that the causes 
for base erosion and profit shifting are a combination of tax planning 
coordinated strategies aimed for the circumvention of the PE status13. 
However, it could be argued that what Action Plan 7 tries to do is to update 
the PE threshold to the modern way of doing businesses around the world in 
order to prevent the loss of tax revenue, which is not only caused by tax 
planning, but is caused due to the existing threshold.  
Nevertheless, as it will be later developed throughout this essay, it could be 
argued that updating or revising the PE threshold in order to take it closer to 
what the UN MC suggests, might not be the only solution for base erosion 
and profit shifting. In other words, I propose to consider the tax policy 
followed by the Andean Pact Model, which mainly consists of the elimination 
of the concept of PE.  
By way of disregarding the PE threshold, what the Andean Pact Model tries 
to achieve is that the taxing rights over business profits obtained by the 
performance of activities within the source country, end up being allocated 
directly to the source jurisdiction. Moreover, there might be arguments in 
favour of the distribution of taxing rights on Avi Yonah´s proposal to adopt 
the formulary profit split method for allocating business profits from 
multinational enterprises. 
In order to provide arguments in favour of this hypothesis, I will provide 
explanations on the existing linking rules that justify source taxation of 
business profits within the OECD´s PE threshold and the UN´s PE threshold. 
Ultimately, I will explain the criterion chosen by the Andean Pact Model 
aimed to protect the source base, which its technic might be considered 
similar to what Georg van Schanz had proposed already in the 19th century. 
 
1.2 Aim 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comparison of some of the existing 
distributive rules for allocating the taxing rights over business profits between 
source and residence countries according to the OECD MC, the UN MC and 
the Andean Pact MC. All of these models serve the same purpose and the 
                                                 
13 Action Plan 7, Page 9, Paragraph 1 of the Introduction.  
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same function: allocating the taxing rights over a certain type of income 
between source and/or residence by way of giving priority to one of them. 
In order to achieve such purpose it will be necessary to analyse which are the 
current characteristics of the PE threshold in the different Model Conventions 
under analysis. The study will be approached with a comparative analysis 
between the linking factors between the OECD MC, the UN MC and the 
Andean Pact MC in regards to the PE threshold. 
Moreover, since the aim of the BEPS project is to suggest possible changes 
to the PE definition in order to prevent the artificial avoidance of the PE 
status, it is worth comparing which are some of the existing linking factors 
that justify source taxation over business profits and what consequences 
might flow from the choice of certain connectors.  
In this sense, Avi-Yonah explains that comparative taxation has been 
suggested to be:  
‘an instrument to advance, inter alia, successful tax reforms, cultural 
understanding, democratic values, legal harmonization and a better 
understanding of domestic tax laws’.14 
Taking into consideration the fact that BEPS project might be questioning the 
existing allocation rules by way of revising the PE threshold, in this particular 
case, the richness of performing a comparative analysis, is to search for 
possible solutions to the problem of base erosion and profit shifting. In this 
particular context, I would like to consider what the Andean Pact Model 
already proposes as a solution for the protection of the source-base.  
A comparative approach will facilitate an understanding of some of the 
common difficulties that arise in cross-border transactions as well as to 
identify the mechanisms chosen by each Model Convention in order to 
counteract such difficulties in accordance with their tax policies goals. 
Comparing the distributive rules of taxing powers in relation to business 
profits, will help to develop an understanding of the underlying differences 
as well as the convergences of the tax policies that each Model Convention 
represents.  
 
1.3 Method and material 
The study that was carried out consists of the comparison of the functions that 
different tax systems serve. Despite the fact that the study provides a brief 
analysis of domestic laws, the main objective of this paper is to focus on the 
policy choices proposed and followed by different international set of rules, 
                                                 
14 Avi-Yonah, Nicola Sartori and Omri Marian, “Global Perspectives on Income Taxation 
Law”, Published by Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011, Section II. 
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such as the OECD MC, the UN MC and the Andean Pact MC. The 
transcendence of analysing the tax policies instead of a particular set of 
domestic laws is given by the fact tax policies ‘always remain in the 
background and are always relevant’..15 
The comparative study is required to describe and compare the different set 
of rules as well as to provide arguments for and against of each system. 
Nevertheless, the comparison performed also took into consideration the 
functions that each set of rules provides. In this sense Carlo Garbarino has 
stated:  
‘In comparative tax research what really matters is the actual function of tax 
rules, and because often countries share common tax problems, comparative 
tax research turns out to be the discovery of meaningful tax convergence of 
operative rules in spite of apparent divergences of tax systems in terms of 
statutory language or procedures. One of the main tasks of comparative 
taxation is therefore to focus on functional tax convergence, rather than 
apparent tax divergence, and the corresponding result is the discovery of deep 
common structures of taxation (a tax common core)’.16 
As regards the material that has been used, there has been a selection of three 
Model Conventions of Tax Treaties for the Avoidance of Double Taxation. 
These set of rules are the OECD MC, the UN MC and the Andean Pact Model 
Convention. In addition, part of the material used has been the OECD 
Commentaries on the MC and the UN Commentaries of the MC last updated 
versions. Additionally, in order to provide examples of the different 
thresholds of the PE concept a set of three Double Tax Treaties have been 
used.  
The sources of the material used varies from official documents taken from 
official websites of official organisms and institutions, as well as international 
databases such as the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
(hereinafter, “IBFD”) and Wolters Kluwer – Kluwer Law Online (hereinafter, 
“Kluwer). I have also used an Argentinean database called La Ley Online 
supported by Thomson Reuters in order to obtain primary source material. 
Nevertheless, when information provided by the domestic database has been 
used, such information has been supported with secondary source material 
provided by IBFD in order to make it available to non-Spanish speakers. 
Moreover, since the Andean Pact Model´s original language is Spanish, the 
non-official translation into English provided by IBFD has been used. 
However, in cases where the wording used in English differs from the 
                                                 
15 Avi-Yonah, Nicola Sartori and Omri Marian, “Global Perspectives on Income Taxation 
Law”, Published by Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011, Section II. 
16 Carlo Garbarino, “An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and 
Agenda for Research”, Page 14. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116686  
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wording used in Spanish, clarification of the meaning of such words has been 
made by providing definitions from the Real Academia Española (Spanish 
Royal Academy)17. 
1.4 Delimitation 
For the purpose of this paper, the analysis is only focused on the primacy of 
the allocation of the taxing rights over business profits. 
In order to provide a better understanding of the differences in the existing 
tax policies behind some the current allocation rules for business profits in 
the Model Conventions under analysis (OECD MC, UN MC and Andean Pact 
MC), the paper will address the comparative approach using three Double 
Tax Conventions (hereinafter, “DTC”) as examples: 
1) Argentina – Sweden DTC from 1995 (which resembles the UN MC 
and provides an example of what is known as “service PE” and 
“delivery PE”). 
2) Argentina – Denmark DTC from 1995 (which resembles the OECD 
MC and excludes the warehouse for delivery of goods from 
constituting a PE). 
3) Argentina – Bolivia DTC from 1976 (which follows the Andean Pact 
Model and does not provide a definition of PE). 
All of these examples have been chosen because they all share one common 
factor: at least one of the Contracting parties is a developing country. 
Moreover, these DTCs have been selected in order to provide a clear example 
of the differences in the allocation rules derived from the different PE 
thresholds adopted in order to determine which of the two Contracting States 
(either source or residence country) will have primacy for taxing business 
profits. In addition to this, despite the fact that DTCs are the product of States´ 
negotiations, they tend to provide an idea of the underlying tax policy that 
each of those States pursue.   
Additionally, the selection of the above mentioned DTCs have been made 
based on the fact that each of them closely reflect either the Andean Pact 
Model, the OECD MC or the UN MC. These examples will show some of the 
existing differences in determining the primacy of allocation of taxing powers 
between source and residence jurisdictions in relation to business profits. 
As regards the comparison of the PE concept, this study will leave a side the 
traditional explanations of the concept of “fixed place of business” and 
“dependent agent”, due to the fact that exists vast literature referred to them. 
In this context, this study will only provide explanations on the broadening of 
                                                 
17 The Spanish Royal Academy is the official royal institution in charge of regulating the 
Spanish language.  
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the PE concept provided by the UN MC and the considerations made by the 
OECD MC Commentaries in that regard. 
 
1.5. Outline 
The first part of this study will provide a brief explanation on some of the 
traditional principles in international taxation used for justifying source 
taxation, such as the benefits principle and the economic allegiance principle.  
Later on the study will follow an analysis of the rules on allocation of business 
profits in accordance to Article 7 of the OECD MC and the UN MC. Since 
Article 7 assigns the right to tax business profits of a non-resident to the 
source State only when the non-resident holds a PE in such State, I will leave 
the analysis of the PE threshold for the third part, after it has already been 
analysed the allocation rules. In particular, I will provide explanations 
regarding the differences in the allocation rules between the OECD MC and 
the UN MC. Ultimately, I will analyse the Andean Pact Model as a possible 
solution for BEPS.  
I will then continue analysing the PE threshold. In this case, I will provide 
examples of DTCs signed by different countries in order to provide an 
explanation of the “service PE” and the “delivery PE”.   
 
2. A brief introduction to the traditional justifications for 
allowing source taxation or “the agreement” for limiting source 
taxation 
 
2.1.Preliminary remarks  
Most countries apply both source and residence based taxation at the same 
time. Residence taxation taxes residents on their worldwide income. Source 
taxation taxes non-residents on the income derived from sources located 
within the territory of the source country. These regimes produce cases of 
double taxation when a resident of a country derives income from another 
country. This means that the income obtained in the source country will be 
subject to tax there and, additionally, the same income might also be subject 
to tax in the residence country, since this country taxes its residents on their 
worldwide income. In this context, DTCs appeared as a way to solve these 
situations of double taxation18.  
                                                 
18 Avi Yonah Reuven S., “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”, Elgar Advanced 
Introductions, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, Pages 8-9. 
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However, despite the existence of tax treaties aimed at eliminating double 
taxation, most States provide some sort of unilateral tax relief for these type 
of situations. Most countries contain in their domestic law either an 
exemption relief over income obtained abroad or grant a tax credit for the 
taxes paid in the source country. In this context, since most countries provide 
unilateral tools for eliminating double taxation, Avi-Yonah casts doubts 
regarding which is the real function of DTCs. In other words, he argues that 
the real function of a DTC is not to eliminate double taxation in itself, but 
instead he concludes that DTCs´ objective is to shift tax revenue from source 
countries to resident countries19.  
Avi-Yonah´s starting point of his hypothesis is that States would be naturally 
free to levy taxes on the profits derived within their jurisdictions. He states 
that if revenue derives from within a country, and in case there is no DTC, 
such country has the primacy right to tax such income (whether it is active or 
passive income). States would be allowed to levy taxes over the profits 
derived from their territories due to their sovereignty. He also argues that 
countries are naturally not bound by any sort of agreement such as the PE 
concept or any sort of “sourcing rule” that determines when the source 
country may levy a tax over profits derived from its territory. In other words, 
Avi-Yonah argues that the function of a DTC is to limit source taxation by 
way of shifting tax revenue from source to resident countries.20  
Since each State would be free to tax the income arisen within its jurisdiction 
due to the fact that ‘states often tax[ed] profits on the basis of a nexus within 
their boundaries’21, DTCs appear as a legal convention in order to eliminate 
double taxation by way of restricting the taxing powers of the source country 
and shifting income to the residence country. 
Avi-Yonah states that the shift of tax revenue from source to residence 
countries occurs in two ways. For active income, the way to shift taxable 
revenue is by the creation of the concept of PE – only if the non-resident holds 
a PE in the source State, this State would be allowed to levy taxes. Depending 
on how much taxable revenue is desired to be shifted, the PE threshold can 
be adapted. This fact will be later explained with the comparison between the 
OECD´s PE threshold and the UN´PE threshold.  
                                                 
19 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Double Tax Treaties”, Page 2. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1048441  
   
20 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Double Tax Treaties”, Page 2. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1048441 
21 Anshuman Chaturvedi, “Permanent Establishments and Force of Attraction: Some 
Implications of TD Securities, in General and from an Indian Perspective”, International, 
Canada, India, Bulletin for International Taxation, February 2011, IBFD, Page 75. 
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As regards passive income, the way to shift taxable revenue is through the 
reduction of the withholding tax in the source State. The OECD MC provides 
more reduced withholding taxes whereas the UN MC provides higher 
withholding taxes.22  
Notwithstanding the fact that DTCs could be understood as a way to shift 
taxable resources from source to residence jurisdictions, what this shift might 
include or involve, depends on which of the two jurisdictions obtains primacy 
to tax certain piece of income. In other words, it could be argued that the level 
of transferring of taxable income from one jurisdiction to another depends on 
how much do capital exporting countries are willing to give up of their tax 
revenue in order to achieve the desired “capital export neutrality”. 
In other words, since the function of DTCs is to shift tax revenue from source 
to residence countries, it is required to establish in which cases the shifting 
should occur and to what extent should the shifting occur23.  
In this context, it could be argued that DTCs appear as a legal convention 
which are aimed at granting primacy of taxing rights to either residence or 
source State depending on the type of income. Nevertheless, most of the 
traditional theories have focused in providing justifications for source 
taxation since they were aimed at protecting residence taxation. In other 
words, the traditional theories (benefits principle and economic allegiance) 
assume that shifting of tax revenue occurs the other way around as stated by 
Avi-Yonah – from residence to source countries.  
These theories tried to justify in which cases source taxation could be 
triggered since the primacy to tax is given to the residence State. This implied 
that the residence jurisdiction would give up some tax revenue and allow the 
source State to levy taxes only on very specific circumstances. In this context, 
Pasquale Pistone has stated that the PE concept is a legal creation which its 
purpose is to provide a linking connector with a jurisdiction different from 
the one where the main establishment is located. He argues that the PE 
concept also serves as a criterion for source State to execute its taxing powers 
over business profits24. 
2.2.The Benefits principle 
                                                 
22 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Double Tax Treaties”, Page 2. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1048441 
23 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Double Tax Treaties”, Page 2. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1048441 
24 Pasquale Pistone in: Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schich and Claus Staringer, 
“The Impact of the OECD and UN Model Conventions on Bilateral Tax Treaties”, 
Cambridge Tax Law Series, 2012, Page 13.  
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Some of the existing international standards generally give primacy of 
taxation of passive income to the residence State whereas the primacy to tax 
active income is given to the source State. Avi-Yonah states that this current 
division of taxing rights derives from the benefits principle developed by the 
four economists who drafted the first Report on Double Taxation25. However, 
Avi-Yonah argues that the reasoning behind such principle is now obsolete. 
Nevertheless, a large part of the international tax regime is based on the 
benefits principle.26  
Doctrine has provided several reasons for justifying that a certain State is able 
to tax the profits of a non-resident. There are practical reasons such as 
efficiency. It is argued that active income is generally obtained by 
corporations instead of by individuals and, consequently, it is easier to tax a 
corporation in the place where such income was obtained, since defining the 
residence of a corporation can become a difficult task if taken into 
consideration that there are different criteria for establishing where a 
company is resident (place of incorporation or place of management and 
control)27. However, there are more profound reasons that are related to the 
benefits principle. This principle states that the source State provides 
significant benefits to the foreign enterprise to the extent that such benefits 
enable the non-resident enterprise to obtain income in the source 
jurisdiction28.  
The justification for the source State to tax is that the source jurisdiction 
provides directly or indirectly to the foreign enterprise certain services, like 
the provision of infrastructure, education, public policies, and in addition to 
that, it also ensures the enforcement of payments. Avi-Yonah states that 
‘these benefits justify source-based corporate taxation in the sense that the 
host country´s government bears some of the costs of providing the benefits 
that are necessary for earning the income’. 29 In this same sense, Richard 
Vann30 also states that the source country has the right to claim taxes because 
it provided the economic resources for generating the foreign enterprise´s 
                                                 
25 These economists were: Professor Bruins from the Netherlands, Professor Einaudi from 
Italy, Professor Seligman from the United States and Sir Josiah Stamp from the United 
Kingdom. The Report on Double Taxation was commissioned by the League of Nations to 
these four economists in 1923. 
26 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”, Elgar 
Advanced Introductions, Edward Elgar Publishing 2015, Page 4.  
27 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the 
International Tax Regime”, Cambridge tax Law Series, 2007, Page 11.  
28 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the 
International Tax Regime”, Cambridge tax Law Series, 2007, Page 11. 
29 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the 
International Tax Regime”, Cambridge Tax Law Series, 2007, Page 11.  
30 Richard Vann, “Current Trends in Balancing Residence and Source Taxation”, University 
of Sydney, Faculty of Law, December 2014, Sydney Law School Research Paper N° 14/107. 
Electronic copy available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538269  
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income. In addition, Miller and Oats state that even if an enterprise is not 
resident of a certain country, it may still obtain profits there by using the 
facilities and infrastructure of that country31. As a consequence of this, the 
country where the profits are sourced is allowed to tax such profits32. In other 
words, the benefits principle states that the source State provides significant 
benefits to the foreign enterprise to the extent that such benefits enable the 
non-resident enterprise to obtain income in the source jurisdiction33.  
2.3. The Permanent Establishment requirement  
Despite the reasons for justifying source taxation over non-resident´s profits, 
both the OECD and the UN Model Conventions require that there must be a 
permanent establishment (hereinafter, “PE”) in order to enable the source 
State to tax non-resident´s business profits. 
In this context, it is worth mentioning the general criterion set for taxing 
business profits. Article 7 of the OECD Model as well as Article 7 of the UN 
Model state that as a general rule the profits obtained by an enterprise of a 
Contracting State shall be taxable only in such State. However, if the 
enterprise carries on business in another Contracting State through a PE 
situated in that other Contracting State, the profits obtained by the foreign 
company attributable to the PE may be taxed in such other Contracting State 
(the source State). It has been stated that since the last third of the nineteenth 
century, States have been concluding tax treaties which confer exclusive 
taxing rights to the residence State ‘as long as the taxpayer has not maintained 
a PE in the source State’34, which means that source taxation would only be 
triggered if the non-resident holds a PE in the host State.   
Thus, it is apparent the current existing international standard requires that 
the non-resident has a minimum presence or substance in the source 
jurisdiction in order to be subject to source taxation. Such minimum threshold 
is known as a permanent establishment. In this sense, Reimer, Urban and 
Schmid state that the PE threshold is used to define when a particular type of 
income should or should not be taxed in the jurisdiction where it is originated. 
In this sense, the PE threshold serves as a prohibition for the source State to 
                                                 
31 Angharad Miller and Lynne Oats, “Principles of International Taxation”, Bloomsbury, 
Fourth Edition, 2014, Page 25. 
32 Angharad Miller and Lynne Oats, “Principles of International Taxation”, Bloomsbury, 
Fourth Edition, 2014, Page 25.  
33 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the 
International Tax Regime”, Cambridge Tax Law Series, 2007, Page 11. 
34 Ekkehart Reimer, Nathalie Urban, Stefan Schmid, “Permanent Establishments. A domestic 
Taxation, Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective”, Wolters Kluwer, Law&Business, 
PWC, 2012, Page 10, Par. 32.  
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levy taxes over a non-resident who obtains income but which only has a small 
or not even a close connection to the economy of such State35. 
However, the PE threshold varies according to the tax policy the States want 
to achieve. The PE threshold contained in the OECD MC is quite narrow since 
the OECD MC was drafted in order to fulfil the expectations of developed 
and industrialized countries. The idea behind establishing such a narrow 
threshold was to limit source taxation in order to, indirectly, give primacy to 
residence taxation. Since industrialized countries were the ones who provided 
capital to invest abroad, if the profits derived from the foreign investments 
were to be taxed both in the residence State of the investor and in the source 
State where the profits were generated, then there would be no reason for 
investing abroad. Even if States provided tax reliefs unilaterally, the need for 
promoting international trade required that the combination of domestic and 
foreign taxation had the most neutral effect possible.  
One of the reasons for providing a narrow threshold for the existence of a PE 
in the OECD MC had to do with the fact that in order to promote investment 
abroad this type of investment needed to have the same effect as if the 
investment was made within the same country of the resident person. In this 
context, the need for ensuring that investing abroad or locally would have the 
same effect, the residence State needed to provide a tax relief for the taxes 
paid abroad over the income earned abroad36. This is known as Capital Export 
Neutrality (hereinafter, “CEN”). 
CEN requires that the investor´s decision to invest either in its own country 
of residence or in another country, should not be influenced by any tax 
wedge37. Whereas Capital Import Neutrality (hereinafter, “CIN”) requires 
that the investment made by a foreign investor in a certain jurisdiction shall 
bear the same tax burden that a local investor would bear in the same 
jurisdiction38. 
Residence-based taxation is considered to be in line with CEN. CEN implies 
that the investor should pay the same total amount of tax, including both the 
domestic tax and the foreign tax, regardless of where the income comes from 
(either from domestic sources or foreign sources). CEN is best achieved if the 
                                                 
35 Ekkehart Reimer, Nathalie Urban, Stefan Schmid, “Permanent Establishments. A domestic 
Taxation, Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective”, Wolters Kluwer, Law&Business, 
PWC, 2012, Page 11, Par. 35.  
36 Michael Lang and Jeffrey Owens, “The Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development 
and Protecting the Tax Base”, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series N° 2014-
03. Universität Wien, Page 30. 
37 Wolfgang Schön, “International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I)”, 
World Tax Journal, October 2009, IBFD, Page 71. 
38 Wolfgang Schön, “International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I)”, 
World Tax Journal, October 2009, IBFD, Page 71. 
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country of residence of the investor grants a tax credit for the taxes paid 
abroad39.    
However, in order not to see the residence State´s revenue reduced due to the 
granting of reliefs, States promoted for a narrower PE threshold in order to 
limit the cases that could give rise to a PE in the source State. In this sense, 
Adolfo Martín Jimenez states that: 
‘The fear of industrialized countries to give up revenue in favour of source 
countries probably was an additional driving force behind the position 
adopted, first, by the League of Nations and later on by the London and 
OECD Models’.40 
Contrary to what happens with the PE threshold contained in the OECD MC, 
the UN MC provides a definition of PE which tends to give the primacy of 
taxing rights to the source State. Since the UN MC is aimed to help or protect 
developing countries, the PE concept is used as a mechanism to strengthen 
the taxing powers of such developing countries41, which in most cases are the 
countries were foreign investments are made. 
2.4. The Economic Allegiance Theory 
The foundation of the current standards for determining the linking factors 
for source jurisdiction, can be found in the Report on Double Taxation 
commissioned by the League of Nations in 1923. The four economists who 
drafted the Report went over different options for a standard criterion of tax 
jurisdiction, such as political allegiance or nationality, residence, domicile or 
permanent residence, and location of wealth or origin.  
One of those economists – Seligman – proposed that for double taxation 
issues it would be useful to combine two principles of major importance: 
“origin” and “residence” into something bigger that was called “economic 
allegiance” or “economic interest”. Through the “economic allegiance” 
principle, Seligman considered that it was possible to recognize the taxing 
                                                 
39 Michael Lang and Jeffrey Owens, “The Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development 
and Protecting the Tax Base”, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series N° 2014-
03. Universität Wien, Page 7. 
40 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of the PE Status”, Papers on 
Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries”, September 2014, Page 
14. Moreover, Adolfo Martín Jimenez: As a matter of fact, the elimination of double taxation 
was a concern of countries with enterprises doing business abroad and, because these 
countries, in order to promote cross-border commerce, gave relief for taxes paid abroad, it 
was natural that they tried to limit the source country power to tax income obtained by their 
residents in order to avoid tax costs for their –by them very affected because of the War and 
the Great Depression-- budgets. There was the feeling that relief should be split between 
source and residence countries, or, in some cases of balanced trade, that source countries 
could give up their rights if a reciprocal treatment was granted to their business.  
41 Pasquale Pistone in: Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schich and Claus Staringer, 
“The Impact of the OECD and UN Model Conventions on Bilateral Tax Treaties”, 
Cambridge Tax Law Series, 2012, Page 13. 
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rights of the country of origin and the country of residence and, from that 
point onwards they could agree on how to share those taxing rights. 
Nevertheless, he recognized that ‘this problem is perhaps the most difficult in 
the whole realm of double taxation because of the conflicting interest of 
various countries” particularly the differing interests of borrowing and saving 
countries’.   42   
The second part of the Report on Double Taxation established the ‘four 
elements of economic allegiance – origin of the wealth; the situs of the wealth; 
enforcement of the rights to wealth; and residence or domicile – which 
determine the country of taxation’. 43 The Report in itself was aimed at giving 
primacy to taxing rights to the resident State. The only exception to the 
residence State taxation was the existence of a PE, which has remained the 
same since that time till nowadays44. The historical and practical idea was that 
the source country would only be able to tax business profits derived from the 
physical presence of production factors (“fixed elements”) located in the 
within its jurisdiction45.  
It is worth mentioning that despite the fact that the Report on Double Taxation 
appeared to introduce the “economic allegiance” concept (which provided the 
existing distributing rules of taxing rights), Klaus Vogel points out that this 
concept had already been introduced previously by a German author, Georg 
van Schanz. Moreover, Klaus Vogel states that the authors of the Report on 
Double Taxation did not follow the original “economic allegiance” concept 
provided by Georg von Schanz46.  
From the very origins, the German author from the 19th century argued about 
tax liabilities and he stated that the only principle that could be fair and 
equitable for distributing the tax burdens between taxpayers is the principle 
of the “economic allegiance”. He completely discarded the residence as a 
benchmark for determining tax liabilities as well as nationality or even the 
mere physical presence in a territory. He considered that all these parameters, 
such as residence, nationality or physical presence lead to the negative aspect 
                                                 
42 Sunita Jogarajan, “Stamp, Seligman and the Drafting of the 1923 Experts’ Report on 
Double Taxation”, World Tax Journal, 2013 (Volume 5), No. 3, Published online: 23 
September 2013, 4.7. 
43 Sunita Jogarajan, “Stamp, Seligman and the Drafting of the 1923 Experts’ Report on 
Double Taxation”, World Tax Journal, 2013 (Volume 5), No. 3, Published online: 23 
September 2013, 7. 
44 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of the PE Status”, Papers on 
Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries”, September 2014, Page 
14.  
45 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of the PE Status”, Papers on 
Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries”, September 2014, Page 
15.  
46 In Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation 
of arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 4.  
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of which the taxpayers were taxed but they did not obtain anything in return. 
In other words, they did not acquire any sort of benefit from the State that 
levied the taxes, or, in the best scenario, they would only obtain a partial 
benefit. For these reasons, according to Klaus Vogel, Georg van Schanz 
considered that these parameters were unfair and inequitable.47  
Klaus Vogel also states that Georg van Schanz argued that the most fair and 
equitable parameter for distributing the tax burden on taxpayers would be the 
“economic allegiance” principle. Nevertheless, Vogel explains that Georg 
van Schanz expressed that he knew that this criterion might be generally 
disapproved because it tended to revert the historical and well accepted 
benefit principle.48 Schanz argued that the economic allegiance principle 
could be based on mere consumption or based on business activities:  
‘To the extent economic allegiance is founded on consumption, residence 
would constitute a suitable criterion, but it could not be the only controlling 
principle. Where a person is economically bound not only to the state of his 
or her residence, but also to another state through business activities or by 
way of income arising in the other state, Schanz deems the allegiance to this 
other state, the source state, to be more important than that to the state of 
residence’.49  
Vogel explains that Georg van Schanz argued that even though the Residence 
State should get its portion of income, the source State – where the income is 
generated – should get a greater portion of such income. In this context, Georg 
van Schanz considered it necessary to divide the tax base following this 
parameter: greater piece of share to the source State and a smaller one to the 
residence State50.  
Nevertheless, according to Klaus Vogel, Georg van Schanz´s theory was 
misunderstood or adapted to the circumstances of the beginning of the 20th 
century. Some authors understand that the “economic allegiance” concept 
from Schanz is the equivalent of the benefits principle. Klaus Vogel clearly 
states that: 
‘All that has remained from his suggestions is the term 'economic allegiance', 
which is applied, however, today as a blanket term by everyone to his or her 
convenience. The four experts appointed by the League of Nations in 1921 to 
                                                 
47 In Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation 
of arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 4. 
48 In Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation 
of arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 218 onwards. 
49 In Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation 
of arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 218 onwards. Emphasis added. 
50 In Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation 
of arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 219. 
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prepare a report on question of double taxation2' - Gijsbert Bruins from the 
Netherlands, Luigi Einaudi from Italy, Edwin Seligman from the United 
States and Sir Josiah Stamp from the United Kingdom - in their report 
delivered in 1923 adopted the term, but their conclusions and 
recommendations were practically the opposite of those Schanz had 
proposed’.51 
Today one of the most accepted ways to give rise to source taxation is if the 
foreign company has a PE in the source State, which can be appreciated when 
analysing Article 7 of the OECD MC and the UN MC. However, by its 
definition, the PE concept is still very attached to a physical presence to a 
higher extent in the OECD MC and to a lower extent in the UN MC. 
Consequently, there are still non-resident companies economically bounded 
to the source State but which are not subject to tax there. Apart from the fact 
that some corporations artificially avoid the PE status, the current PE 
definition (as it is defined by the OECD MC and the UN MC) is also leaving 
a side persons who are still economically linked not only to their residence 
State, but also to the source State due to the performance of business activities 
or due to the arising of income in the source jurisdiction.  
2.5.Intermediate remarks 
From the explanation provided above, it can be appreciated that throughout 
history, doctrine has attempted to justify source taxation assuming that the 
primacy to tax always corresponds to the residence State. It could be argued 
that those theories were incentivized due to the fact that originally the only 
way to perform business activities in another country was by having a 
substantial presence there. However, commerce has changed in a way that 
there is no need to have a substantial presence in order to perform a business 
in another country. Moreover, as it has already been explained, Georg van 
Schanz had already stated that the physical presence in a jurisdiction is not a 
requirement in order to justify income taxation.52 For these reasons, it could 
be argued that the PE requirement in order to trigger source taxation might 
not be useful to solve the problems of base erosion and profit shifting. In this 
context, I would like to consider the possibility of the Andean Pact Model as 
a possible solution to BEPS. 
From this point onwards, the comparative approach of this paper will be 
performed taking into consideration Avi-Yonah´s point of view that the 
objective of a DTC is to shift tax revenue from source countries to residence 
countries. The comparative approach will show that the more industrialized 
                                                 
51 Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of 
arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 219. 
52 Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of 
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the Contracting States taking part in a DTC are, the narrower the PE concept 
is and, consequently, the bigger the shifting of taxable revenue from source 
to residence countries. On the other extreme, the less developed the countries 
taking part in a DTC are, the wider the PE concept is (if there is any sort of 
PE requirement) and, consequently, the smaller the shifting of taxable income 
from source to residence jurisdictions (if there is any shifting at all).   
3. How does the law stand today? What problems arise due 
to the application of different criteria as regards the shifting of 
taxable income from the source jurisdiction to the residence 
jurisdiction? 
 
3.1.The rules for the allocation of business profits between residence 
and source countries (the OECD MC and the UN MC). The rules 
for attributing profits to a PE (OECD MC and  UN MC)  
Both the OECD MC and the UN MC establish in Article 7.1 that the business 
profits obtained by an enterprise resident in a Contracting State, shall be 
taxable in that State. However, if that enterprise carries on business activities 
in another State through a PE, then the profits attributable to such PE may be 
taxed in the State where the PE is located, namely the source State53. As it 
can be noticed, triggering source taxation depends on what is considered to 
give rise to a PE in the source State. According to the OECD MC 
Commentaries, Article 5 of the MC (PE concept) does not allocate taxing 
rights over business profits in itself. Once it is determined that a non-resident 
performs activities through a PE in the source country, then it is necessary to 
establish which are the profits (if any) that the source country may tax54.  
The OECD Commentaries confirm the rule that only if the non-resident has a 
PE in the source country, can such foreign enterprise be regarded as having 
participation in the economic life of the source State to the extent that such 
State can have taxing powers over the non-resident´s PE profits55. As regards 
the concept of PE, Pasquale Pistone states that the PE concept is a legal 
creation which its purpose is to provide a linking connector with a jurisdiction 
different from the one where the main establishment is located. He argues that 
                                                 
53 The rule contained in Article 7 of the OECD MC and UN MC does not apply to specific 
cases such as profits derived from the operation of ships and aircraft in international traffic 
or for certain categories of income that may also constitute business profits such as income 
derived from personal activities of an entertainer or sportsperson.  
54 OECD MC Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention, Article 7, 
Paragraph 2.  
55 OECD MC Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention, Article 7, 
Paragraph 11. 
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the PE concept also serves as a criterion for source State to execute its taxing 
powers over business profits56. 
3.2.Limitations to the attribution of profits to the source State – The 
force of attraction 
According to the OECD version of Article 7 the source State where the PE is 
located has the right to tax only the profits attributable to the PE and is not 
allowed to tax other profits that the foreign enterprise may derive within the 
source country but not through the PE57. The OECD MC rule constitutes a 
prohibition of what is known as the “force of attraction” rule. According to 
this rule, the source country would be able to tax not only the profits 
attributable to the PE but also other income arising from the source territory 
as long as the non-resident holds a PE in the source jurisdiction. Thus, the 
“force of attraction” rule would give the right to the source country to tax 
income of the non-resident such as business profits not attributable to the PE 
and also dividends, interests and royalties derived within the host country58.   
This “force of attraction” rule has been highly rejected worldwide mostly by 
developed countries. On the one hand, the detractors of this principle have 
stated that the “force of attraction” rule is undesirable because it taxes income 
from activities that are totally unrelated to the existing PE. On the other hand, 
such countries also claim that the activities that would fall under the “force of 
attraction” would not have enough substance to even constitute a PE and still 
would be subject to taxation. Additional arguments against this rule are also 
related to the fact that it would generate uncertainty for taxpayers59.  
The OECD Commentary provides an example of the rejected practice: a 
foreign enterprise sets up a PE in another country in order to perform 
manufacturing activities and, at the same time, another part of the same 
enterprise sells different products in the same country through independent 
agents. If the host country, where the PE is located, would aggregate and tax 
the profits of each activity (the manufacturing performed by the PE and the 
sales performed by the independent agents), it would constitute a tax policy 
that ‘would interfere seriously with ordinary commercial activities and would 
be contrary to the aims of the Convention’.60 As it can be appreciated, the 
objective of the OECD´s profit attribution rule is to limit the taxing rights of 
                                                 
56 Pasquale Pistone in: Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schich and Claus Staringer, 
“The Impact of the OECD and UN Model Conventions on Bilateral Tax Treaties”, 
Cambridge Tax Law Series, 2012, Page 13.  
57 OECD MC Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention, Article 7, 
Paragraph 12.  
58 OECD MC Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention, Article 7, 
Paragraph 12. 
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the source country only to what can be attributable to the PE. Nevertheless, 
even though a limited version of the “force of attraction” rule has been 
accepted by the UN MC, this version does not promote the above mentioned 
example rejected by the OECD.  
Conversely, Article 7 of the UN MC states if the non-resident has a PE in the 
source country, the profits of the non-resident may be taxed by the source 
State ‘but only so much of them as is attributable to (a) that permanent 
establishment; (b) sales in that other State of goods or merchandise of the 
same or similar kind as those sold through that permanent establishment or 
(c) other business activities carried on in that other State of the same or similar 
kind as those effected through that permanent establishment’.61  
The UN MC “force of attraction” rule is still a limited version of the general 
one. In other words, the “limited force of attraction” rule implies that once 
the foreign enterprise holds a PE in the source State, the source country is 
allowed to tax the business profits ‘arising from transactions by the enterprise 
in the source country, but not through the permanent establishment’.62 This 
means, that the source country may tax the business profits other than those 
of the non-resident that are directly attributable to a PE, such as sales of the 
same goods or similar ones ‘as those sold through that permanent 
establishment or other business activities carried on in that other State of the 
same or similar kind as those effected through that permanent 
establishment’.63  
The “limited force of attraction” only extends to other business profits apart 
from those attributable to the PE, but does not include dividends, interests and 
royalties:  
‘If an enterprise has a permanent establishment in the other Contracting State 
for the purpose of selling goods or merchandise, sales of the same or a similar 
kind may be taxed in that State even if they are not conducted through the 
permanent establishment; a similar rule applies if the permanent 
establishment is used for other business activities and the same or similar 
activities are performed without any connection with the permanent 
establishment’.64  
In other words, the strength of the “limited force of attraction” is such that for 
example, if an enterprise holds a PE in the source State, through which it 
renders services, all other income derived from services of the same or similar 
kind provided within the source state by the same enterprise but not through 
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the PE, may still be attributed to that PE and be subject to taxation in the host 
country.65 
3.3.The risk of the Force of Attraction Rule – What are the possible 
uses of the rule? 
It could be argued that there are points of view for supporting the “limited 
force of attraction” rule. On the one hand some of the supporters state that 
this rule prevents administrative problems such as establishing which the 
activities related with the PE are and which profits are supposed to be 
attributable to the PE66. It should be noted that for a country to include the 
attraction rule in its DTCs, the rule must exist beforehand in its domestic law.  
On the other hand, some of the States that have introduced such a rule into 
their DTCs mention that the purpose of the rule is not to work as an “attraction 
rule” but instead as an anti-abuse measure67. The purpose of using the 
“attraction” rule as a safeguard measure, is to neutralize the efforts of foreign 
enterprises to carry on direct sales instead of carrying on them through the PE 
and avoid source taxation68. The UN MC in its Commentaries state that some 
of the States that adopt the “limited force of attraction” rule, consider that this 
rule should be left aside when the foreign enterprise is able to prove that the 
sales or business activities similar to the ones performed by the PE in the same 
source State were carried out not by the PE but instead by the non-resident 
for reasons other than obtaining treaty benefits. In this sense, the UN MC 
Commentaries state:  
‘This recognizes that an enterprise may have legitimate business reasons for 
choosing not to carry out sales or business activities through its permanent 
establishment’.69  
An example of this statement is reflected in the positions adopted by some 
non-OECD economies in respect to the OECD MC. Argentina (as well as 
Morocco and Thailand) in respect to Article 7 of the OECD MC stated that 
where there is a PE situated in its territory, it reserves the right to apply the 
“limited force of attraction rule” as it is indicated in the UN MC. However, 
Argentina states that it will apply this rule as a sort of a “safeguard rule against 
abuse”, consequently it will preclude the application of such a rule when the 
non-resident shows that the sales and/or the activities were not carried out 
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through the PE for reasons other than obtaining a benefit from the tax treaty70. 
In this context, Argentina has mostly included the “limited force of attraction” 
rule as a safeguard clause into the DTCs concluded with other States. 
Argentina would not be allowed to apply the “attraction” rule in itself, mainly 
because its domestic law does not provide so. Nevertheless, the attraction rule 
as a safeguard has not been implemented so far, since there have been no 
cases where the tax authorities have claimed abuse in order to apply it71. 
According to a study carried out by the Universität Wien, the countries that 
more often include the “limited force of attraction” rule in their DTCs are: 
Nigeria, Indonesia, Vietnam, Tanzania, Kenya, India, Thailand and 
Kazakhstan. However, it has been stated that these countries, in some of their 
DTCs, apply the rule only in abusive circumstances72. 
In this context, it could be argued that the “limited force of attraction” rule 
might serve two different purposes. On the one hand, as it has already been 
mentioned, it would serve just as a tax policy. It could happen that a country´s 
domestic law permits taxation of not only profits attributable to the PE but 
also other profits derived from the source State belonging to the head office 
of the PE.  
On the other hand, it could serve as a “safeguard” clause to counteract abusive 
practices. In either of the two cases, uncertainty arises due to the need to 
determine when an activity is similar to the one perform by the PE. It could 
be argued that it becomes difficult to determine when a good, merchandise or 
activity is “similar” to other ones. In this regard, it could be argued that the 
most important aspect is the “similarity test” in order to determine if business 
profits not attributable to a PE might still be subject to source taxation. In 
addition to this, some other problems regarding interpretation might also 
arise. For instance, the boundaries established by the UN MC in respect of 
the “limited force of attraction” have not always been respected.  
For example, one of the countries that has included the “limited force of 
attraction” rule in its DTCs has been India. A decision issued by the Income 
Tax Appellate Tribunal of Delhi shows a wider interpretation of this rule. An 
example of the wider interpretation of the “limited force of attraction” can be 
given by SNC-Lavilin/Acres Inc. v. ADIT73 case which involved the 
                                                 
70 OECD MC Commentaries, Positions on Article 7, Paragraph 3.  
71 Rubén Horacio Malvitano, branch reporter, E&Y Partner Argentina, IFA Cahiers 2014 - 
Volume 99A: Cross-border outsourcing – issues, strategies and solutions – Argentina, Page 
79, IBFD. 
72 Michael Lang and Jeffrey Owens, “The Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development 
and Protecting the Tax Base”, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series N° 2014-
03. Universität Wien, Page 4. 
73 India - SNC-Lavilin/Acres Inc. v. ADIT, 16 September 2011 (Decision), IBFD version. 
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interpretation of the rule under the Canada-India DTC74. Before providing 
further information, it is important to mention that the DTC involved follows 
the exact wording of the UN MC75. In this case, the foreign enterprise was a 
Canadian resident which provided technical consultancy services to an Indian 
client. Some of the services rendered by the Canadian resident were partly 
performed in India and partly in Canada. As a consequence of the services 
rendered in India, the Canadian resident had a PE in India76. Consequently, 
the business profits attributable to the PE were subject to taxation in India. 
However, the Indian tax authorities understood that due to the “limited force 
of attraction” rule, the profits obtained by the enterprise for the services 
performed in Canada were also subject to taxation in India. The Income Tax 
Appellate Tribunal of Delhi confirmed the tax authorities’ point of view and 
understood that due to the “limited force of attraction” rule established in the 
Canada-India DTC (Article 7.1.b), the entire income obtained by the 
Canadian resident was taxable in India. The Indian Tribunal took into 
consideration the fact that the work performed in Canada was the same or 
similar as the type of work performed through the PE located in India. 
Therefore, those similar activities even if they had been performed outside 
the host State were still subject to taxation in that country.  
This decision shows a wider interpretation of the “limited force of attraction”. 
While the UN MC version only extends the taxing rights of the host State 
over the sale of similar goods or the performance of similar activities as those 
of the PE but still performed within the source country, the Indian Tribunal 
of Delhi extended the rule and the source country taxing rights to activities 
performed outside the host State. Nevertheless, the Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal of Mumbai followed a stricter interpretation of the UN MC.  
In Clifford Chance v. ADIT77 the question brought to the Tax Tribunal was 
whether the provision of consultancy services provided by a UK residence 
outside India were subject to tax in India. The problem arose due to the 
provision of business profits contained in the India-UK DTC78. The provision 
                                                 
74 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of 
India for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, E102409 - CTS 1997 No.16. 
75 Canada – India DTC. Article 7.1: “The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall 
be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting 
State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on or has 
carried on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State 
but only so much of them as is attributable to: a. that permanent establishment, and; b. sales 
of goods and merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold, or from other business 
activities of the same or similar kind as those effected, through that permanent 
establishment.” 
 
76 The concept of service PE will be later developed in point 5.2.1.1.  
77 India - Clifford Chance v. ADIT, ITA No. 2060-61/ Mum/ 2008, Decision date: 13 May 
2013, IBFD version. 
78 UK – INDIA DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION SIGNED 25 JANUARY 1993, 
Entered into force 25 October 1993. 
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states: ‘(1) The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable 
only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the 
enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may 
be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is directly or indirectly 
attributable to that permanent establishment’. In this instance, the Mumbai 
Court concluded that the services provided outside of India where not directly 
attributable to the PE. In addition, the offshore services could neither be 
considered as indirectly attributable due to the fact that Article 7.3 of the 
India-UK DTC limited the scope of the expression indirectly79. Even though 
the Mumbai Court considered that the services rendered outside India were 
not subject to taxation in India, the Court did not derived its decision from the 
interpretation of the “limited force of attraction rule”. Moreover, the Court 
reasoned that Article 7.1 of the India-UK DTC was not comparable to Article 
7.1 of the UN MC.   
3.4.Intermediate commentaries 
If the “limited force of attraction” rule is not considered as a “safeguard 
clause”, but instead as a tax policy, it can be seen as either an extension of the 
source state’s right to tax or a limitation of the shift of taxable resources from 
the source state to the residence state. In any case, the force of attraction rule 
could be argued to bring several uncertainties, because as it has been shown 
some Courts interpret it a in a wider manner than what it is expected to be. 
However, some other States only include it in its tax treaties as an anti-abuse 
rule, which means that they do not pretend to widen its taxing powers but only 
to use it in cases where there is an abusive situation (in this last case, it could 
also be argued which of the two parties, either the taxpayer or the tax 
authorities, have to satisfy the burden of proof). An additional problem of 
interpretation could be argued to exist with the words “same or similar”. 
These words imply a subjective interpretation by the tax authorities and the 
judges.  
If the “limited force of attraction” rule is only considered to be a tax policy, 
it is worth noting Avi-Yonah´s idea that the aim of DTCs is to shift tax 
revenue from source to residence countries, due to the fact that nothing would 
prevent the source country first tax any profit arising within its territory, 
except for an agreement such as the concept of PE for active income. 
Therefore, the OECD rule for allocation of profits could be argued to consist 
                                                 
79 India – UK DTC. Article 7.3 states: “(3) Where a permanent establishment takes an active 
part in negotiating, concluding or fulfilling contracts entered into by the enterprise, then, 
notwithstanding that other parts of the enterprise have also participated in those transactions, 
that proportion of profits of the enterprise arising out of those contracts which the 
contribution of the permanent establishment to those transactions bears to that of the 
enterprise as a whole shall be treated for the purposes of paragraph (1) of this Article as being 
the profits indirectly attributable to that permanent establishment.” 
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in an expansion of the shift of taxable profits from the source to the residence 
country, since the host State is prevented from taxing the income other than 
the one attributable to the PE. A wider shifting of taxable income from source 
to the resident State ensures capital export neutrality, therefore the residence 
country would have to grant a tax credit for the taxes paid in the source 
country only in very specific circumstances. 
3.5.Attribution of profits 
Despite the differences between the OECD MC and the UN MC, they both 
state that the rule for the determination of the profits attributable to a PE is 
based on the arm´s length principle. The profits that the PE makes are the 
ones that it is expected to make as if it were a separate and independent 
company performing the same or similar activities and functions as well as 
involving similar assets and risks. The aim of the rule is to determine that the 
profits attributable to the PE are ‘determined as it if were a separate 
enterprise’.80 As a consequence of this, it could happen that profits would be 
attributable to the PE even though the company had not made any profits at 
all or vice versa. 
Once the profits attributable to the PE are taxed by the source State, the 
residence State must grant a tax relief to the enterprise. Article 23 of the 
OECD MC an UN MC states that when a resident of a Contracting State 
derives income that may be taxed in the other Contracting State, the residence 
State shall exempt such income or grant a tax credit allow equal to the income 
tax paid in the State of source. 
 
4. The Andean Pact solution –  Each one gets what it deserves 
There are few existing multilateral tax treaties in force, one of those is the 
Andean Community Pact, first signed in 1971 and lastly updated in 200481. 
For reasons that will later be provided, this Pact could be seen as a reflection 
of Georg van Schanz´s theory of economic allegiance. Georg van Schanz 
considered there to be an allegiance with the source State when a person is 
economically bound to the host State ‘through business activities or by way 
of income arising in the other state’.82 Moreover, according to Klaus Vogel, 
Georg van Schanz stated that the physical presence in a jurisdiction is not a 
requirement in order to justify source taxation. In this sense, the Andean Pact 
MC holds particular characteristics that bear some resemblance to the concept 
                                                 
80 OECD MC Commentaries, Article 7, Paragraph 17. 
81 The 2004 update was concluded by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  
82 Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of 
arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 5. 
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of “economic allegiance” of Georg van Schanz as regards the concept of PE, 
the concept of source, and the allocation rules.  
First of all, as a general rule, Article 2 f) of the Andean Pact MC states that 
the meaning of the expression “source of production” refers to the ‘activity, 
right or asset that generates or may generate an income’.83 It is worth noting 
that the Andean Pact MC definition of “source of production” is close with 
what Peggy and Richard Musgrave have stated of the concept of “source”. 
They defined the source ‘as the place of the income-generating activity and 
[they] discuss primarily the attribution of business profits when business 
activities are carried on in more than one country’.84 Klaus Vogel discussed 
that the source ‘refers to a state that in some way or other is connected to the 
production of the income in question, to the state where value is added to a 
good. In contrast, the type of connection that establishes the 'source' of income 
cannot be defined generally’.85 
In addition, Article 3 of the Andean Pact provides a general rule for the 
allocation of taxing rights among the Member States. This general rule states 
that regardless of the nationality or domicile of the persons (whether a natural 
person or a company) income of any kind that these persons would obtain, 
shall be only taxable in the Member State in which such income has its source 
of production. As a consequence of this, the other Member States which, in 
accordance with their domestic law, hold the power to tax such income must 
exempt it from taxation. In particular, as regards business profits, Article 6 
states that profits resulting from business activities shall be taxable only by 
the Member State where they were obtained/effected/performed/executed86.  
I is worth noting that the Andean Pact MC does not use the term nor the 
concept of PE, but instead provides a list of examples of cases in which it is 
considered that a company performs activities in the territory of another 
Contracting State. The list is not exhaustive and comprises several examples 
also given by the PE definition of the OECD MC and the UN MC. However, 
as the list is not complete, any type of activity performed within a Member 
State will be subject to taxation in such host country. Due to the lack of a 
definition such as the PE concept, the source State is free to tax whichever 
activity occurs within its territory and the residence State is the one which has 
to cede its right to taxation. In this sense, the lack of the PE concept in the 
Andean Pact MC shows that any economic connection, whether a substantial 
                                                 
83 Unofficial translation, IBFD.   
84 Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of 
arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 8. 
85 Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of 
arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 8. 
86 The Spanish version uses the verb “efectuar”. According to the Real Academia Española 
(Spanish Royal Academy) this verb involves the execution of something, in particular of an 
action. The IBFD unofficial translation of the 1971 version of the Andean Convention uses 
the verb “obtain”. 
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or a loose link, of a non-resident with the source jurisdiction, justifies the 
primacy of source taxation.  
It is noticeable that the Andean Pact Model ‘adopts exclusive source 
taxation’87 and provides only the exemption method as the default method for 
relieving from double taxation. This is in line with the tax policy objective of 
the Andean Members, which are capital importing countries, and which 
support source-based taxation and believe that residence countries should 
cede their taxing powers to source countries88. In addition, the tax policy of 
these countries provides an example of capital import neutrality achievement, 
since investments from other countries compete on equal footing with local 
investors in the domestic market. In this case the neutrality is completed with 
the exemption method as a way to grant tax relief from double taxation, which 
means that the exclusive right to tax remains in the hands of the host State 
and the residence State has the obligation to exempt the income from tax.89    
The Andean Pact could be argued to be a perfect example of Avi-Yonah´s 
theory that DTCs´ purpose is to shift taxable income from source countries to 
residence countries, since under basic circumstances the source country is 
‘allowed to impose the first tax on any revenue deriving from sources 
within’90. Since there is no concept that functions as a limitation for source 
taxation (as the PE concept does), there is no actual shift from source to 
residence jurisdiction. Moreover, Article 7 of the Andean Pact establishes that 
when a company carries out activities in two or more Member Countries, each 
of them may tax the income generated within their territory. In other words, 
it does not matter whether there is a fixed place of business or a dependent 
agent, or a building site; it does not matter whether the activities are carried 
out during a certain period of time; it does not matter whether the business 
activities have any type of substance as the one required by the OECD MC or 
the UN MC. As long as a foreign company conducts activities in the territory 
of another Contracting State, they will be subject to taxation in the country 
where they were performed. Moreover, the Andean Pact restricts residence 
taxation to the extent that in case a company conducts activities in two or 
more Member States, each of them is allowed to tax what is produced within 
their territories. 
                                                 
87 Victor Thuronyi, “Tax Law Design and Drafting”, Volume 2, International Monetary Fund, 
1998, Page 729, Footnote 20. 
88 Victor Thuronyi, “Tax Law Design and Drafting”, Volume 2, International Monetary Fund, 
1998, Page 729, Footnote 20. 
89 Michael Lang and Jeffrey Owens, “The Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development 
and Protecting the Tax Base”, Vienna University, WU International Taxation Research Paper 
Series, No. 2014 – 03, Page 7. Electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398438   
90 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction”, University of Michigan, 
Page 2. Electronic copy available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1048441  
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5. What is the nexus that justifies source or residence 
taxation? – The variations in the PE threshold. The examples of 
the OECD MC, UN MC and Andean Pact MC 
 
5.1.The PE  
The existing international standards require that in order for a non-resident to 
be taxed by the source jurisdiction it must have a certain presence in such 
jurisdiction. That presence is known as a PE. Only if a foreign company has 
a PE in the source State, may it be required to pay taxes in the source State. 
In this context, the concept or the definition of PE becomes a determining 
factor. 
At its origins, cross-border transactions closely depended on physical 
presences; it was in this context that the PE concept was conceived91. Because 
of this, the foundations of the PE concept are based on the existence a fixed 
place of business which necessarily implies a physical presence of the foreign 
company in the source jurisdiction. This meant that in cases where the 
economic link was not sufficient, it was easier to leave the levy of taxes to the 
residence State. In this line of ideas, in the Final Report on the Concept of PE 
of 8th November 1957 it was said:  
‘A special provision to deal with these people [itinerant merchants, pedlars, 
watermen, circuses and travelling entertainers] is not, in the view of the 
Group, necessary because the incomes will, in general, be small and it is likely 
to be most difficult to tax them in any country except the one in which they 
reside . . . loss of tax which a country may suffer through giving up its right 
to tax itinerants, etc., from other countries is likely to be more or less 
compensated by the fact that it will have the sole right to tax itinerants 
residing within its own border’.92 
Nevertheless, the PE threshold varies in accordance with the tax policy 
pursued by a country. This means that depending on the PE threshold, the 
taxing powers of the source State might be larger or smaller. In addition, the 
PE threshold also determines to certain extent which of the two jurisdictions 
                                                 
91 Eva Escribano López has said: After all, the economic context in which the PE concept 
arose is a context characterised by the so-called brick-and-mortar business models. Thus, in 
a context in which a physical presence was critical to perform any kind of business activities 
(including the provision of almost all services), a threshold entirely based on this parameter 
seemed to be an appropriate way to measure a sufficient degree of involvement in the 
economic life of the host state, sufficient enough to trigger taxing rights by the latter state 
(Eva Escribano López, “An oportunistic, and yes appropriate, revision of the source threshold 
for the twenty-first century tax treaties”, Intertax, Volume 43, Issue 1, 2015 Kluwer Law 
International BV, The Netherlands, Page 8). 
92 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of the PE Status”, Papers on 
Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries”, September 2014, 
Footnote 47.  
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– either source or residence – have primacy of taxing rights over business 
profits of a non-resident.  
Some of the existing variations in the PE threshold currently used by some 
countries will be analysed following a list of examples provided by DTCs 
signed between at least by one developing country.    
5.2.The examples 
 
5.3.Argentina – Sweden DTC from 1995. The broadening of the PE 
Threshold. The departure from the OECD MC. Comparison 
between the “service PE” of the UN MC and the suggested 
“service PE” provision introduced by the OECD Commentaries 
in 2005.  The concept of “delivery PE” 
 
5.4.The “service PE” 
The Convention between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Argentine Republic 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with respect to Taxes on Income93 (hereinafter, “Argentina – Sweden DTC”), 
concluded in 1995 follows the UN MC and as a consequence of this, provides 
a clear example of primacy of the allocation of taxing rights given to the 
source State.  
It is worth mentioning that the Argentina – Sweden DTC of 1995 is a 
renegotiation of the same tax treaty concluded in 1962. However, the 1962 
version did follow the OECD MC instead of the UN MC and as a consequence 
of this, it provided a PE threshold much narrower, which required the 
existence of a fixed place of business or a dependent agent in the source State 
in order to constitute a PE. In most cases, the tax treaties signed by Argentina 
during 1970 -1980 tended to be negotiated taking as a parameter the OECD 
MC whereas, after the 1990´s, tax treaties that had already been signed where 
re-negotiated having as a parameter the UN MC94.  
The Argentina – Sweden DTC of 1995 places Argentina in a better position 
when allocating the taxing rights of business profits between Sweden and 
Argentina. This tax treaty involves a developed country (Sweden) and a 
developing country (Argentina)95. Most likely the developed or industrialized 
country would try to follow the OECD MC, which its essence is to give 
certain priority on the allocation of taxing rights to the residence State by way 
                                                 
93 Entered into force in June 5th, 1997.  
94 Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch and Claus Staringer, “The Impact of the 
OECD and UN Model Conventions on Bilateral Tax Treaties”, Cambridge Tax Law Series, 
2012, Page 45. 
95 DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for reporting on 2014, 2015 and 2016 flows, OECD 
Aid Statistics. Electronic information available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm  
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of restricting the PE threshold. In contrast, the developing country would try 
to follow the UN MC.  
The UN MC is aimed at developing countries and tries to protect source 
taxation since this Model is based on the assumption that the source State is 
the developing country. To this end, the UN MC is aimed at providing a larger 
portion of taxing rights to the source jurisdiction. This means that larger 
amounts of profits generated in the source State will be subject to source 
taxation. This is exactly what happens with the Argentina – Sweden DTC of 
1995, because it departures from the OECD MC and provides a larger PE 
threshold, more business activities will give rise to a PE in the source country 
(Argentina) and as a consequence of this, larger amounts of profits generated 
by Swedish corporations will be subject to taxation in Argentina. 
Nevertheless, the UN MC as well as the OECD MC requires the existence of 
a PE in the source jurisdiction in order to justify the taxation of the income 
obtained by a non-resident.  
The way in which the UN MC achieves the protection of the source-base by 
granting larger taxing rights to the source State can be seen in the PE 
definition. The UN MC gives certain priority to the source State when 
distributing the taxing rights of business income between the residence and 
the source. The priority can be appreciated in Article 5 of the UN which 
provides a broader PE threshold so as to include not only the profits 
attributable to a fixed place of business or a dependent agent, but also are 
included in the PE definition what it is known as “service PE” and “delivery 
PE”. 
In our example it can be appreciated that Article 5 of the DTC between 
Argentina and Sweden of 1995 states that for the purposes of the DTC, 
"permanent establishment" comprises a fixed place of business through which 
the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.  
However, when the OECD MC in Article 5.2 states that the term PE also 
includes a place of management; a branch; an office; a factory; a workshop 
and a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place relating to the 
exploitation of natural resources, the Argentina – Sweden DTC keeps this 
same structure. However, it also provides an additional provision: Article 5.3 
which contemplates what it is known as “service PE”. 
Article 5.3 states:  
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the 
furnishing of services, including consultancy and exploration services, by an 
enterprise through employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise 
for such purpose, shall be considered a permanent establishment where such 
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activities continue within the country for a period or periods aggregating more 
than six months within any twelve month period.’96 
This provision resembles Article 5.3 (b) contained in the UN MC. The slight 
difference between the Argentina – Sweden DTC of 1995 and the UN MC is 
that the UN MC provides a more specific time period, instead of six months, 
the UN MC says “183 days”.   
Overall, the essence behind this Article is to tax services rendered by a 
Swedish enterprise in Argentina which might even include consultancy and 
exploration services, and which last for more than six months in a twelve 
months period (even if the services are supplied by shorter periods than six 
months, if these periods are aggregated and result in a larger period of six 
months in a twelve month period, are also considered to be a PE).  
This provision shows that there is no need for a Swedish enterprise to have a 
fixed place of business or a dependent agent in Argentina in order to give rise 
to a PE, but as long as the Swedish enterprise supplies services in Argentina 
through employees or personnel engaged by the Swedish enterprise, and if 
the time requirement is also fulfilled, the Swedish company is going to be 
considered to have a PE in Argentina, and as a consequence of that, the profits 
attributable to such PE are going to be subject to taxation in Argentina. 
It is worth noting that the provision or supply of services by a non-resident in 
another country, even if they consist of consultancy services, do not in itself 
give rise to a PE under the OECD MC. However, this does happen in the UN 
MC. This situation does not require a physical place of business. In other 
words, the foreign provider of the services is not required to have a fixed place 
of business in the source jurisdiction, however, it is still required to have some 
kind of presence: at least an employee or personnel engaged by the foreign 
enterprise. As Jean Schaffner says, the traditional “physical PE” can only 
exist if there is a sufficient infrastructure, whereas the “service PE” only 
requires the presence of employees in the source country supplying the 
relevant services97. In contrast as what it is required by Article 5.5 of the 
OECD MC (dependent agent) the employee of Article 5.3 (b) of the UN MC 
is not even required to conclude any type of contracts in the name of the 
principal98. 
The so-called “service PE” is aimed at protecting the source base since it still 
provides a “nexus” with the source jurisdiction that is not as strict that the 
“physical PE” (fixed place of business) and allows at the same time to the 
                                                 
96 Argentina – Sweden DTC of 1995.  
97 Jean Schaffner, “The Territorial Link as a Condition to Create a Permanent Establishment”, 
Intertax, Volume 41, Issue 12, Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, 2013, Page 
643. 
98 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid & Marianne Orell, “Permanent Establishments, A 
Domestic Taxation, Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective”, Third Edition, Wolters 
Kluwer Law&Business, PWC, 2014, Page 119, Paragraph 402.  
37 
 
source country to levy taxes on the profits derived within its territory. The 
idea behind this provision is that the foreign company derives income within 
the source country, and in addition the foreign enterprise benefits from the 
infrastructure provided by the source country. In other words the “nexus” 
established by the “service PE” provides a manifestation of economic 
allegiance from the non-resident with the source territory, and it serves as 
justification for source taxation. 
The “service PE” concept does not rely on the fact that a foreign enterprise is 
supplying services to a resident of the source State, instead this concept only 
relies on the fact that there must be at least an individual present in the source 
jurisdiction performing the services99. 
The “service PE” shows a restriction to the limitation provided by the OECD 
MC PE threshold. In other words, even though the OECD MC provides that 
the source jurisdiction may tax the profits attributable to the PE of a foreign 
company, the PE threshold is limited by a physical nexus. The immediate 
effect of this nexus is that all the remaining activities, such as the provision 
of services in the source State, as they do not fall under the scope of PE, are 
not subject to taxation in the source country and end up being taxed at 
residence (if taxed). In this context, it could be argued that the “service PE” 
constitutes a departure from the limitation established by the OECD MC in 
regards to source taxation.  
The UN MC Commentaries express that developing countries requested the 
introduction of the “service PE” due to the fact that they considered that 
management and consultancy services supplied in developing countries by 
developed or industrialized States generated large amounts of profits100. 
However, the PE threshold provided by the OECD MC has also brought some 
concern to developed countries which are foreign investment receptors. In 
this context, in 2005 the OECD MC Commentaries incorporated a chapter 
called “The Taxation of Services” at the end of the Commentaries on Article 
5. These Commentaries incorporate the concept of “service PE” and provide 
some guidance to those countries willing to incorporate such concept into 
their tax treaties. However, the “service PE” concept has not been introduced 
in the Model itself.  
The incorporation of the “service PE” concept even only in the Commentaries 
of the OECD MC shows some willingness to protect or reinforce the source 
base taxation. The “service PE” concept in the OECD Commentaries provides 
the idea that States have started seeing that some important revenues are being 
lost because the PE definition in itself. It could be argued that the limitations 
to source taxation once introduced were suitable for the brick and wall type 
                                                 
99 OECD MC Commentaries, Paragraph 42.31. 
100 UN Commentaries, Page 107/108, Commentary on Article 5 Subparagraph 3 (b), 
Paragraph 9.  
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of commerce. However, with changes in the economy and the way trade can 
be developed without the need of having a significant physical presence in a 
certain territory, the result is that there are some activities that are still linked 
to the source jurisdiction and that generate profits but are left untaxed if the 
traditional PE concept continues to be applied. 
In other words, States´ concerns are related to the fact that there are services 
being performed in their territories, but as they do not fall under the scope of 
the PE definition, are left untaxed. These States consider that if the services 
are performed within their jurisdictions, they should have the right to tax the 
profits derived even if such profits from those services are not attributable to 
the traditional concept of PE.  
The OECD MC Commentaries provide a clear justification for allocating the 
taxing rights of income derived from services to the source State: there are 
some significant level of business activities, such as services, that do not even 
require the presence of a fixed place of business101, but still imply an 
economic connection and engagement with the host State.   
At the same time, the arguments given in order to prevent source taxation 
over services, such as administrative and compliance costs, are considered to 
be insufficient in order to exclude source taxation. In fact, there are some 
States that due to their domestic legislations already tax the supply of services 
by a non-resident in their territory. These Sates tend to have in their domestic 
law a withholding tax that should be withheld by the resident who is making 
the payment to the non-resident. However, the OECD MC Commentaries 
state that the taxes should be levied over the profits attributable to the services 
rendered in the source State and not be levied over the payments made by the 
residents to the non-residents102. 
In comparison with the UN MC´s “service PE” provision, the period of time 
required to constitute a PE is the same: a period or periods exceeding in the 
aggregate 183 days in a twelve months period. However, the “service PE” 
provision suggested by the OECD Commentaries provides some additional 
requirements that the UN MC provision does not require. The OECD 
Commentaries´ suggested provision states that it shall be considered to 
constitute a PE the furnishing of services performed through an individual 
who complies with the time threshold of 183 days in a twelve months period 
and in addition to this, more than 50 % of the gross revenues attributable to 
active business activities of the enterprise during such period of time are 
generated by the services rendered by such individual in the source State103. 
It shall also be deemed to constitute a PE when during the same time threshold 
the services are performed by one or more individuals who are present in the 
                                                 
101 OECD MC Commentaries on Article 7, Paragraph 42.16.  
102 OECD MC Commentaries to Article 5, Page 115 onwards. 
103 OECD MC Commentaries on Article 7, Paragraph 42.23 a).  
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source country rendering such services and those services are performed for 
the same project or for connected projects104.  
This suggested provision by the OECD establishes an extension of the PE 
threshold broadening to some extent the taxing rights of the source State as 
regards profits derived from services. Nevertheless, this suggested provision 
limits to some extent the allocation of those taxing rights to the source 
jurisdiction. If we compare the OECD provision with the UN provision, the 
first option of the OECD “service PE” version provides an additional 
requirement. This requirement states that the services must generate profits 
that represent more than 50% of the gross revenues attributable to the business 
activities performed by the foreign enterprise.  On the other hand, the second 
case covered by the OECD provision resembles the UN MC version: they 
both require the rendering of services through individuals and such services 
must be supplied for an aggregating period of 183 days in a twelve months 
period for the same or a connected project. This last provision shows a 
departure from the original PE threshold as well as from the original 
limitation of the allocation of taxing rights to the source taxation.    
As regards the persons who are involved in the furnishing of services, the UN 
MC states that such persons need to be employees of the non-resident 
enterprise or other personnel engaged by the non-resident. In this sense, the 
OECD MC Commentaries on taxation of services states that it should be 
applicable the general rule that applies to PEs. This means that the business 
of the foreign enterprise shall be performed by the entrepreneur or persons 
who are under a paid-employment relationship with the non-resident 
enterprise.  
5.5.Intermediate conclusions on “service PE”  
Avi-Yonah has mentioned that the concept of “source” has turned out to be a 
“legal concept” rather than an “economic concept”. In this sense, even though 
economists cast doubts regarding the possibility of establishing that income 
has a natural defined source, the concept of “source” is still necessary. In this 
context, “source” tends to be defined by “source rules” which are generally 
accepted105, such as the PE concept. 
Avi-Yonah´s conceptualization of “source” is different from what Peggy and 
Richard Musgrave have previously stated about this concept. According to 
Klaus Vogel, these authors have analysed the concept and have defined it as 
the place of the income-generating activity and [they have] discuss[ed] 
primarily the attribution of business profits when business activities are 
                                                 
104 OECD MC Commentaries on Article, Paragraph 42.23 b). 
105 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”, Elgar 
Advanced Introductions, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015. 
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carried on in more than one country106. In this context, Klaus Vogel discusses 
that source ‘refers to a state that in some way or other is connected to the 
production of the income in question, to the state where value is added to a 
good’.107 Taking in consideration Peggy and Richard Musgrave´s idea of 
“source”, it could be argued that the “service PE” concept justifies source 
taxation due to the fact that there is some sort of income-generating activity 
by the non-resident in the source jurisdiction. However, Avi-Yonah´s point 
of view that the concept of “source” is a legal convention also makes sense, 
especially when it is taken into consideration that Avi-Yonah understands that 
one of the aims of Double Tax Treaties is to shift tax revenue from source 
jurisdiction to residence jurisdiction. 
5.6.The “delivery PE”. A comparison between the Argentina – 
Sweden DTC of 1995 and the Argentina – Denmark DTC of 1995 
Another example of broadening of the PE threshold provided by the UN MC 
and followed by the Argentina – Sweden DTC of 1995 is what is known as 
the “delivery PE”. 
Both the OECD MC and the UN MC in Article 5.4 provide an exhaustive list 
of cases that shall be deemed not to constitute a PE. The lists of both MC 
resemble each other except for a key word: delivery. 
On the one hand, according to the Argentina – Sweden DTC of 1995, (which 
resembles the UN MC) the cases that shall be deemed not to constitute a PE 
are: 
(a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage or display of goods 
or merchandise belonging to the enterprise; (b) the maintenance of a stock of 
goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of 
storage or display; (c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise 
belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another 
enterprise; (d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the 
purpose of purchasing goods or merchandise or of collecting information, for 
the enterprise; (e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the 
purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory 
or auxiliary character; (f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely 
for any combination of activities mentioned in subparagraphs (a) to (e), 
                                                 
106 Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of 
arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 8. 
107 Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of 
arguments” (Part I), Intertax, 216, 1988/8-9, Page 8. 
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provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting from 
this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary character108.   
On the other hand, according to the Argentina – Denmark DTC of 1995109 
(which resembles the OECD MC), the cases that shall be deemed not to 
constitute a PE are: 
(a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery 
of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise; (b) the maintenance 
of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the 
purpose of storage, display or delivery; (c) the maintenance of a stock of 
goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of 
processing by another enterprise; (d) the maintenance of a fixed place of 
business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or merchandise or of 
collecting information, for the enterprise; (e) the maintenance of a fixed place 
of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other 
activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character; (f) the maintenance of a fixed 
place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in 
subparagraphs (a) to (e) provided that the overall activity of the fixed place 
of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary 
character. 
As it can be appreciated, the Articles of both tax treaties are similar and they 
all constitute situations which will not constitute a PE even if the non-resident 
holds a fixed place of business in the source country110. The only exception 
is the fact that the purpose of the use of facilities or the maintenance of stock 
in the host State changes according to which of the two MC is followed. The 
OECD MC allows the use of the facilities or conservation of goods in the 
source country as long as they are used or kept for storage, display or delivery. 
However, the version of the UN MC has eliminated the purpose of “delivery”, 
which means that a delivery activity might constitute a PE in the host State111.  
For example, in cases in which a non-resident holds a warehouse where it 
keeps goods with the objective of delivering them, that situation would 
constitute a PE. As a consequence of that, the profits attributable to such PE 
will be subject to taxation in the source country.   
One of the reasons for having excluded the term “delivery” was because a 
number of States considered that holding a stock of goods for rapid delivery 
                                                 
108 Article 5.4 of the DTC between Argentina – Sweden of 1995. 
109 Convention between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government 
of the Republic of Argentina for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital. Entered into force in the 4th  
of September 1997. 
110 UN MC Commentary referring to the OECD MC Commentary, Page 119, Paragraph 18 
of the UN.  
111 UN MC Commentary, Page 97.  
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would enable the sale of goods owned by the non-resident in the source 
country and would ensure the earning of profits without being taxed in the 
host State112.  
In other words, if the OECD MC is followed, the maintenance of stock of 
goods for the purpose of delivery in the source country would enable a foreign 
company, which sells goods online, to promptly deliver the sold goods in the 
host State without constituting a PE. Consequently, as no PE would be held 
in the host country, no taxes would be levied by such jurisdiction. However, 
a business activity as the one provided in the example, is far from resembling 
to a preparatory or auxiliary activity. It is worth mentioning that the aim of 
the list of cases provided by Article 5.4 of the OECD MC as well as the UN 
MC is to prevent the taxation of activities that are merely preparatory or 
auxiliary. In other words, according to the OECD Commentary the common 
feature of all the listed activities is that they are preparatory or auxiliary113. 
However, the sections a) to d) of Article 5.4 do not explicitly express that they 
have to be preparatory or auxiliary activities. The purpose of that list is only 
provided by the Commentaries.  
In this context, States have shown some concern and it is one of the issues of 
discussion under the BEPS project to the extent that one of the proposed 
amendments to the PE definition of the OECD MC is to clarify that all the 
activities listed in Article 5.4 are subject to the condition of being preparatory 
or auxiliary114.  
If the core business of a foreign company involves a prompt delivery of goods 
after selling them online, it could be argued that it is quite unlikely that such 
activities qualify as auxiliary or preparatory. Instead, it is quite likely that they 
are the principal business activity of the company. In this context, the solution 
provided by the UN MC, by eliminating the word “delivery” from the list of 
Article 5.4, ensures that foreign companies who hold an economic connection 
with the source State would be subject to tax there.  
Nevertheless, there are some disadvantages that States deciding to delete the 
word “delivery” should consider. On the one hand, the UN Commentary 
states that it might happen that the revenue collected by the “PE delivery” 
might not always consist of large sums. On the other hand, the UN 
Commentary forecasts that due to the lack of attention to the characteristics 
of the “PE delivery”, tax authorities might end up attributing too much 
                                                 
112 UN MC Commentary, Page 124, Paragraph 20.  
113 OECD MC Commentary, Page 103, Paragraph 21.  
114 Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of the PE 
Status”, 2014/2015, OECD, Amendment “E”, Page 15, Paragraph 15 onwards.  
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income to those PEs. Consequently, it might produce an increase of litigation 
procedures115.      
Nonetheless, despite the difficulties that might arise due to the deletion of the 
word “delivery”, such measure has been proposed in Action Plan 7 against 
BEPS. In case the amendment “E” is not adopted (clarification that all the 
activities of Article 5.4 have to be preparatory or auxiliary) the other 
suggestion to be adopted would be amendment “F” which, if applied would 
produce the deletion of such word giving birth to the so-called “delivery PE”. 
5.7.The protection of natural resources also widens the PE threshold 
Only as a further exemplification of broadening of the PE threshold, the tax 
treaties analysed above provide special characteristics not contemplated in the 
UN MC. 
The Argentina – Sweden DTC of 1995 states in Article 5.5 that offshore 
activities performed in the other Contracting State related with ‘the 
exploration or exploitation of the seabed and subsoil and their natural 
resources situated in that other State, as well as fishing conducted in the 
exclusive economic zone of that State, shall be considered a permanent 
establishment where the activities are carried on for a period or periods 
exceeding in the aggregate 30 days in any twelve month period’.  
At the same time, Argentina – Denmark DTC of 1995 also broadens the PE 
threshold when considering that fishing activities, which continue for a period 
of more than three months within any twelve month period, also constitute a 
PE.  
5.8. Intermediate commentaries on the PE definition in Argentina´s 
domestic law  
According to Article 69 b) of the Argentinean Income Tax Law, a PE of a 
foreign company shall be deemed to be considered as a resident for tax 
purposes, and as a consequence of this it would be subject to worldwide 
taxation. However, a non-resident which does not hold a permanent 
establishment or agency in Argentina will be subject to tax only on 
Argentinian-source income116.  
In this context, Article 14 of the Income Tax Law also provides that branches 
as well as permanent establishments should keep their accounting records 
separately from their parent companies and other branches and other 
                                                 
115 UN MC Commentary, Page 124, Paragraph 21.  
116 Corporate Taxation Argentina, IBFD, Author: Eduardo O. Meloni, Page 22 (The chapter 
is based on information available up to 1st of October 2014).  
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permanent establishments or subsidiaries of these. In addition, when 
necessary they should provide corrections in order to determine their taxable 
income sourced in Argentina. Moreover, in case of an insufficient accounting 
or when it does not accurately reflect Argentina’s net income source, the tax 
authorities may consider that the domestic entities and the foreign entities 
form an economic unit and may determine the respective net gain subject to 
tax117. 
The Income Tax Law does not provide any sort of definition for the PE 
concept. Nevertheless, the Minimum Deemed Income Tax Law provides a 
list of cases that shall be considered to constitute a PE: a branch; a sole 
proprietorship; a fixed place for the supply of technical, scientific or 
professional services provided by natural persons; an agency; a permanent 
representation; a place of management or administration; an office; a factory; 
a workshop; a rural immovable property (even if it is not exploited); a mine, 
quarry or other place of extraction of natural resources; a construction or 
assembly site; and fixed place of business for acquiring goods or for 
collecting information for the enterprise118. 
In addition, the PE threshold becomes wider when the PE definition provided 
by the Minimum Deemed Income Tax Law departures from the traditional 
definitions of the OECD MC as well as the UN MC and states that it shall 
constitute a PE: the use facilities for the purpose of storage, display or 
delivery of goods by the person, company, sole proprietorship or undivided 
estate to whom they belong as well as the maintenance of stocks of such goods 
for such purposes.   
Despite the broad non-exhaustive list of cases that constitute a PE according 
to Argentina´s domestic law, the Tax Authorities have issued an Opinion 
(DAT 150/1994)119 in which a taxpayer had requested to be treated, for tax 
purposes, as a permanent establishment of a foreign company. The Opinion 
of the Tax Authority concluded that the taxpayer shall be deemed to be treated 
as a permanent establishment as long as it fulfills the legal and jurisprudential 
requirements that would enable the tax authorities to conclude that a 
permanent establishment exists. The Tax Authorities highlighted a decision 
issued by the National Tax Court in 1980 in which it was stated that a 
permanent establishment requires not only the existence of fixed facilities but 
also the continued pursuit of activities. In addition, in order to determine 
whether a PE exists, it constitutes a matter of fact that will require a complex 
                                                 
117 Unofficial translation.  
118 Corporate Taxation Argentina, IBFD, Author: Eduardo O. Meloni, Page 19 (The chapter 
is based on information available up to 1st of October 2014). Also Law N° 25.063 (Impuesto 
a la Ganancia Mínima Presunta - Minimum Deemed Income Tax Law), Article 2(h). 
119 DICTAMEN 150/1994 DIRECCION ASESORIA TECNICA DAT Nacional, Date: 15th 
of September of 1994. Source: La Ley Online, Thomson Reuters, Checkpoint.  
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examination of the establishment’s activities and also its permanence, the 
powers of management or administration in decision-making, and its 
relationship with the head office120. These criteria have consistently been 
reiterated by the National Tax Court in further decisions, such as Unión Pak 
Sociedad Anónima121.  
Taken in totality, doctrine holds that in order to determine whether a PE exists 
or not, it mostly constitutes a matter of fact and evidence122.     
5.9.Argentina – Bolivia DTC of 1976 – The non-existence of PE 
The Convention Between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Bolivia 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income or 
Profits and on Capital and Net Wealth (hereinafter, “Argentina – Bolivia 
DTC”) entered into force in 1979123. This DTC has been negotiated following 
the Andean Pact MC which means that it favours source-based taxation.  
First of all the Argentina – Bolivia DTC distributes the taxing rights between 
the Contracting States: the income, the gains or profits of any nature, derived 
by persons of any nationality or domicile, shall be taxable in the Contracting 
State where such income, gains or profits arise.  
Secondly, as regards business profits, Article 7 states that they shall be taxable 
only by the Contracting State in which such business activities have been 
carried on. In case an enterprise carries on activities in both Contracting 
States, each of them may tax the income, gains or profits derived from within 
its territory. This article resembles the Andean Pact MC, however, the 
Argentina – Bolivia DTC does not provide any list of cases in which a 
company shall be considered to conduct activities in the territory of the other 
Contracting State. In other words, the DTC does not provide any sort of 
definition in order to justify or to restrict source taxation, which means that 
any activity124 performed by an enterprise in one of the Contracting States is 
going to be subject to taxation there no matter if the activity involves a loose 
economic connection with the host State.   
It could be argued that the PE description provided by the Argentinean 
domestic law is as wide as the list of situations that are considered to 
constitute activities performed by a foreign company in the host State 
                                                 
120 La Industrial Paraguaya Argentina S.A., T.F.N. Sala C 11/3/80, Unofficial translation.  
121 Unión Pak Sociedad Anónima, Tribunal Fiscal de la Nación, Sala C, Date of Decision: 
6th of June of 2010, Paragraph VI in fine. 
122 Diana M. Queirolo in Chapter IX, Impuesto sobre la Ganancia Mínima Presunta 
(Minimum Deemed Income Tax Law), Régimen Tributario Argentino (Argentinean Tax 
Regime), Gustavo J. Naveira de Casanova et all., Abeledo Perrot, 2010, Page 298. 
123 Effective date: 1st of January of 1980.  
124 Article 2(g) of the Argentina – Bolivia DTC defines “business activitiess” as “activities” 
undertaken by enterprises of either of the Contracting State.  
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contained in the Andean Pact MC. This means that both lists are merely 
exemplary and, they indirectly imply that any sort of activity performed 
within their territories is going to trigger source taxation.  
In this sense, it could also be argued that both the Andean Pact MC and 
Argentina´s domestic law, do not even need to provide any definition (not 
even descriptive) in order to clarify what triggers source taxation. The 
position adopted by Argentina and Bolivia in the DTC reflects the lack of 
necessity to even provide a list of circumstances that would be considered as 
constituting activities undertaken by an enterprise in the other State. 
In this context, it could be argued that Avi-Yonah´s statements regarding the 
fact that “source” is only a “legal concept” and not an economic one, could 
be only applicable to the OECD MC and the UN MC. It could be argued that 
both the benefits principle and the economic allegiance principle (as it was 
understood by the four economists who drafted the Report on Double 
Taxation) also served as a legal convention aimed at establishing when source 
taxation was justified. However, it could be argued that the Andean Pact MC 
provides arguments against such statement, since this MC assigns taxing 
rights to the Contracting State where the income had its source of production. 
Moreover, in order to clarify any doubt, the Andean Pact provides a definition 
of “source of production”, which refers to any activity, right or asset that 
generates or may generate an income. 
If taking into consideration what the Andean Model prescribes, the benefits 
principle and the economic allegiance principle could not even become 
applicable to this situation, because source taxation is triggered despite 
considering if the enterprise received any sort of benefit from the host 
country. In addition, there is no requirement of substantial economic 
allegiance with the host State as the current OECD or UN PE threshold 
requires.  
Nevertheless, even though the Andean Pact definition of “source of 
production” resembles Peggy and Richard Musgrave definition of “source” 
(the place of the income-generating activity), it could also be argued that 
income does not have a ‘naturally defined source’.125 In fact it could be argued 
that a piece of income might have more than one source. However, Avi-
Yonah explains that the source rules applicable to active income are 
substantive since these type of rules try to track the economic source of 
income126.       
                                                 
125 Avi- Yonah, “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”, Elgar Advanced 
Introductions, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, Page 12.  
126 Avi- Yonah, “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”, Elgar Advanced 
Introductions, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, Page 12. 
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6. Final remarks  
The comparison developed throughout this paper shows that the primacy of 
taxing rights over business profits differs in accordance with the tax policy 
that the countries involved seek to achieve. It could be stated that the order of 
priority given to source taxation changes according to the economic 
development and industrialization of the countries involved.  
Even though the three MCs compared in this paper show that all of them give 
primacy of taxing rights over business profits to the source jurisdiction, the 
OECD MC and the UN MC limit the ability of the source State to tax business 
profits only to income that is attributable to the PE. Even though the UN MC 
tries to expand the PE threshold in order to prioritize source taxation in more 
numerous situations than what the OECD PE threshold allows, the UN MC 
still requires the existence of a PE in order to justify or trigger source taxation.  
Alternatively, the Andean Pact MC provides a distribution of the taxing 
powers merely based on source taxation. It could be argued that the division 
of taxing rights effected by the Andean Pact MC is more impartial, unbiased 
and fairer since each of the contracting parties obtains what it deserves. In 
this sense, the Andean Pact MC states that the “source of production” refers 
to the activity, right or asset that generates or that is able to generate an 
income127. However, it could also be questioned, to what extent does a piece 
of income only has one source of production.  
Nevertheless, the Andean Pact MC complies with the tax policy that its 
Member countries aim to achieve. The Andean Members aim for a capital 
importing neutrality which involves that anyone who is doing business in a 
certain State face the same type of tax regime128 and are subject to the same 
tax rates.   
On the other hand, it could also be stated that the distribution of taxing rights 
proposed by the Andean Pact lacks fairness since if it had not been for the 
foreign investment created by the residence State, the source country would 
not have been able to benefit from the use of the foreign capital to finance 
costs or projects. In this sense, McLure quotes Hufbauer who provides 
arguments against the idea that residence countries should share their revenue 
on portfolio income with source countries129. Hufbauer claims that due to the 
                                                 
127 Article 2(f) Andean Pact MC.  
128 Charles E. McLure, JR., “Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income 
Taxes as the International Norm”, National Tax Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June, 1992), 
Published by National Tax Association, Page 146. Electronic copy available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/41788955?uid=3738984&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21106
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129 Charles E. McLure, JR., “Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income 
Taxes as the International Norm”, National Tax Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June, 1992), 
Published by National Tax Association, Page 149. Electronic copy available at: 
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creation by the residence country of a favourable economic environment, the 
creation of portfolio capital was possible, allowing its later investment in 
other countries. In this context, he argues that the residence country should 
be rewarded for that work130. Even though Hufbauer´s arguments are 
addressed for “portfolio investments”, his arguments could also be applicable 
to foreign direct investments.  
Nevertheless, it has been stated that any type of transfer of taxing rights from 
source to residence countries economically harms the developing countries, 
since these countries´ revenue mostly derives from taxing non-residents due 
to the fact that domestic corporate tax is generally quite limited131. It has also 
been stated that foreign direct investment adds value to a country´s 
economy132.  
Nevertheless, the Andean Pact distribution of the tax jurisdiction resembles 
some of the current proposals for taxing multinational enterprises such as the 
formulary profit split method. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing and Michael 
C. Durst propose to adopt the formulary profit split method for allocating 
business profits and they explain that the method would imply a division of 
income ‘from each business "activity" of a multinational group among the 
countries in which that activity is conducted’133. Even though this method 
also involves an agreement in regards with the formula applicable – which it 
also involves an agreement for the assignment of liabilities, risks and 
functions – the method also tries to track back, to some extent, the source of 
production. The method proposed also seeks to distribute and assign taxing 
rights to those countries where the activity was performed, which means that 
it is promoted as a mechanism for taxing business profits at source.    
Despite the existing arguments which support or discourage source-based 
taxation, some of the examples of Action Plan 7 aimed at fighting BEPS, such 
as the introduction of the “service PE” and “delivery PE”, show that the 
traditional order of priority of taxing rights is changing and heading towards 
to a broader PE threshold. And one of the consequences of the broadening of 
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131 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”, Elgar 
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the PE threshold is the change in the allocation rules of taxing rights over the 
business profits. 
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